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Perceptions of line and senior managers in relation to their role in managing
workplace injury and illness were investigated with a large UK manufacturing company.
The significance of this research to occupational health practitioners lies in the fact that
increased understanding of the perceptions of senior and line managers is fundamental
to the success of occupational safety and health programmes. Documentary analysis
and semi-structured interviews were used to assess perceptions. The findings showed
that the managers had a much sounder understanding of their role in injury prevention
than that related to illness prevention. The way in which information relating to injury
and illness data is presented to managers to aid decision making was found likely
to be a fruitful area for further research.
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INTRODUCTION
Research has shown1 that latent failures in working
organizations are of fundamental importance in the
causation of occupational injury. They are also likely
to play as important a role in the causation of occu-
pational illness. Latent failures are defined as those
actions and decisions which are remote from the time
and place of the incident. They are often decisions
taken by line and senior managers relating to work
structure and organization.
Examples of the contribution of latent failures to
injuries caused by work are, sadly, many. They can be
found in the reports of major incidents such as the
sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise2 and the fire
at King's Cross Underground Station,3 both the result
of decisions taken by line and senior managers some
time prior to the accidents. Reason4 has commented
that the potential for spawning latent failures is greatest
at the higher levels of management within an organi-
zation. Much responsibility is, therefore, placed on line
and senior managers to reduce occupational illness
and injury. This responsibility is allocated both by the
organizations they work for and by legislation.
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The ability of managers to take effective action and
make effective decisions in managing occupational
safety and health (OSH) issues is dependant on a
number of interrelated factors, both personal and
environmental.5 Personal factors include their own
knowledge, skills and understanding, whilst environ-
mental factors relate, inter alia, to the relative priorities
of other managerial issues within their employing
organization. However, little research has attempted
to improve our understanding of the shapers of
managers' perceptions within the personal and envi-
ronmental factors referred to above. This is in clear
contrast to the profusion of research relating to other
organizational issues such as managing individuals6 or
innovation in production and marketing techniques,7
for example.
There is some evidence8'9 that safety issues are not
perceived as being controllable by managers in the
same way as other issues within their sphere of re-
sponsibility. The precise reasons for this are not clear,
but may partly be due to the phenomenon Groeneweg9
describes as an attribution effect, i.e. the tendency for
managers to perceive the power to prevent accidents
as resting with the workforce, the solution being to
persuade the workforce to behave more 'safely'.
This paper gives the findings of Phase 1 of a research
programme which is attempting to investigate shapers
of management perceptions in relation to their respon-
sibilities in managing OSH. The programme is being
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carried out in the form of a series of case studies with
a major UK manufacturing company. The company
is an established manufacturer operating several sites
in the UK which range from engineering to chemicals
manufacture.
The significance of this research to occupational
health practitioners lies in the fact that increased
understanding of the perceptions of senior and line
managers is fundamental to the success of occupational
safety and health programmes. Occupational physi-
cians and occupational safety and health practitioners
cannot operate isolated from these considerations. The
'technical' elements of medical or engineering solutions
must be supported by systems of work which are
effectively managed for the reasons discussed above.
AIMS
The aims of the whole study are as follows:
Phase 1: to investigate the perceptions of line and
senior managers in the organization under study in
relation to their OSH role, thereby to begin to clarify
the shapers of perception which may result in decisions
leading to latent failures.
Phase 2: to design and trial an intervention strategy
which helps the organization to address the main find-
ings of Phase 1.
METHOD
The following methodology applies to Phase 1, the
subject of this paper. A mixture of document analysis10
and semi-structured, focused interview techniques"
were used.
Document analysis
The document analysis was of two types: (1) injury
report analysis and (2) sickness absence analysis.
Injury reports. A random sample of 20% («=316) of
all company injury reports for the period January
1992-September 1993 inclusive was taken from the
company's major UK sites. Injury reports pass through
a prescribed route within the organization once initiated.
This route always includes the immediate line manager
of the injured party. The managers are required to
comment on the incident and give recommendations
regarding prevention strategies. The more severe the
injury, the further up the hierarchy the document is
passed for comment. In the case of fatalities or other
severe injuries, an internal board of enquiry is estab-
lished. However, these are relatively rare events: 63%
(«= 199) of the sample reports relate to minor abrasions,
contusions and lacerations.
The injury reports were analyzed to discover the
written responses of line managers in relation to pre-
ventive measures. The responses were categorized by
type, following the failure classification developed by
Reason.4 This classification identifies failures in
planned events which lead to accidental injury as being
'active' or 'latent'. Active failures are those which
immediately lead to the injury and are commonly
associated with the behaviour of operators. Latent
failures, as discussed above, are those which are dor-
mant in the work system and are the result of actions
and decisions, usually of managers, which are imple-
mented distant from the accident site in both time and
space.
Sickness absence analysis. The researchers were keen
to gauge the perceptions of managers relating to broad
occupational health issues as well as the more narrow
topic of injury prevention. However, access to occu-
pational health data proved much more difficult to
secure than that relating to occupational injury. Occu-
pational health provision varies at the company's sites
and few data were available. Therefore, sickness ab-
sence data were crudely analyzed in order to produce
a vehicle for discussions on occupational health with
the managers during the interview phase—admittedly
a less than ideal method. However, the analysis and
subsequent discussion did reveal some worthwhile is-
sues.
The absence records of three representative sites
(one engineering, one chemical production, one
administration) for the period January 1992-October
1993 inclusive were analyzed using a statistical spread-
sheet. This analysis was somewhat superficial in nature
but at least enabled a general picture of sickness
absence to be obtained at those sites. A fundamental
part of sickness absence analysis is the reclassification
of the many and various reported symptoms to allow
analysis. The classifications used here are based upon
the Registrar General's occupational mortality classi-
fications, with some alterations and additions to take
account of conditions which seem to occur more fre-
quently in the organization under study. The resulting
classifications were: headaches; ear conditions; eye
conditions; musculoskeletal conditions; skin condi-
tions; circulatory conditions; respiratory conditions;
gastric conditions; uro-genitary conditions; injuries;
stress and anxiety; ill-defined conditions; and infec-
tious diseases.
Interviews
The semi-structured, focused interviews were carried
out with a sample (w=63) of managers from line and
senior levels at the company's eight major sites. The
sample was structured to allow representation from
the main groupings in both administration and opera-
tions departments. Each of the interviews lasted
approximately 1-1.5 hours and addressed the follow-
ing points:
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• The interviewees' opinions of what causes
accidental injury and what constitutes a typical
accident in their organization
• Their perception of their own role in preventing
occupational injury
• Their views on how health may be affected by
occupation
• Their perception of their own role in reducing
occupational ill health
The main issues arising from responses to these
questions are discussed below.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Documentary analysis
Injury reports. The responses of the managers on the
injury reports were analyzed to determine where these
responses fitted in the categories Active Failure, Active/
Latent Failure and Latent Failure. This analysis was
carried out to provide evidence of managerial percep-
tions relating to the causes of accidental injury and
their actions in relation to possible preventive meas-
ures. These findings could then be compared with the
responses to the interview questions to demonstrate
the extent of managerial understanding of accident
causation. Below are examples of the responses found
during the analysis which illustrate typical responses
in each of the three groupings. During the analysis it
became clear that there was not an unbroken line
between active and latent failures and that some of
the responses contained elements of both types. It was
therefore necessary to have the active/latent category.
Active failures alone
For example:
• Person failure: These responses showed the manager
to perceive an element of culpability on behalf of
the injured party. There was a focus on personal
awareness, e.g. 'the person should be more careful'
or 'the person should pay more attention'.
• Safety awareness training: These responses were
typified by general, undirected comments such
as 'this person requires more training in safety
awareness'.
• Removal of immediate obstacle: In these responses
there was no questioning as to why the object
may have been there in the first place or how a
future recurrence may be avoided.
Active failures with some consideration given
to latent failures
For example:
• Job training or instruction: Responses emphasized
the need for specific task training or retraining.
• Man—machine mismatch: These comments did
highlight possible man-machine mismatches, but
tended to concentrate upon the man rather than
the machine.
Latent failures alone
For example:
• Alternative design, method or procedure: These
responses gave consideration to changes in
systems or procedures.
• Organizational failure: Comments here related to,
for example, conflicting goals or work overload.
• Investigation or review of work systems: Comments
in this category recommended further reviews of
work systems to eliminate latent failures, although
the term 'latent failures' was not actually used.
The graph at Figure 1 shows the relative split of
responses in the three major categories. The split
between categories is 58% active failures, 15% active/
latent failures, 17% latent failures and 10% no response.
This shows an emphasis upon citing operator failure
as being the major contributor to accident causation.
However, as discussed above, the majority of reports
relate to minor injuries which are the result of what
may be classed as 'everyday activities'. Examples of
these are a bruised ankle from falling off the edge of
a kerb or a cut finger from picking up a sharp piece
of metal. Admittedly it is sometimes difficult to see
how managers might make comments which relate to
latent failures when faced with injury reports of this
type. It is far more likely that they will exhort the
injured persons in these examples to take more care
when walking along the pavement or to ensure that
protective gloves are always worn.
The findings of this analysis do point up the impor-
tance of the way information is collected and how it
Figure 1.
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is presented in shaping perceptions. Part of the day-
to-day information managers receive relating to safety
issues in this organization is in the form of injury
reports. This is likely to be true for a great many UK
firms. Managers' perceptions of the likelihood of
serious injuries occurring may be influenced by
receiving much information relating to minor injuries.
The potential for serious injury to occur may then
appear correspondingly lower than it actually is. The
organization studied here carries out a range of checks
and inspections of safety issues such as housekeeping,
guarding of machinery and other similar items which
are also fed back to the line managers. However, these
inspections do not address more latent issues such as
communication failures or breakdowns in safety sys-
tems. Another important feature of this organization's
methods of measuring OSH performance is the
importance attached to the counting of lost time
injuries. Lost time accident incidence rates are used
as measures of Company and site safety performance.
The effect these types of information have on
managers' perceptions, and even on their behaviour,
is a fruitful area for further research.
Sickness absence analysis. The authors understand the
difficulties in drawing conclusions from data such as
sickness absence.12 Self-reported and self-diagnosed
illness is liable to inaccuracies from a number of
sources. Amongst these are: (1) the obscuring of one
illness by reporting other symptoms, e.g. reporting
gastric upset when the real reason for absence may
be stress; (2) misdiagnosis; (3) misrepresentation, i.e.
citing sickness as the reason for absence when it is
due to some other cause; (4) low motivation to attend
work, e.g. due to a boring or repetitive job.
Absences lasting more than seven days require a
medical practitioner's certificate (Med 3) which con-
tains a diagnosis of the illness. Whilst these are much
more likely to be accurate than self-diagnosed spells
of illness, the absence may still be liable to be affected
by some of the points listed above. Despite all these
difficulties and more, it remains that sickness absence
records do provide a body of data which partly relate
to the illnesses suffered by the workforce. Whilst no
hard and fast conclusions may be drawn from the
analysis carried out in this study, the picture which
these data present does show some groupings and
variations by department or occupation type which
are worthy of further investigation. An example of this
can be seen in Figure 2. Graph A shows the results
of the analysis for the engineering site overall. Graph
B shows the results for the welding department. The
welding department graph shows a variation in some
of the causes of absence compared to the site as a
whole. In particular, the welding department's contri-
bution to all site absences due to headaches,
musculoskeletal conditions, respiratory conditions
(including colds and 'flu') and injuries were elevated
as shown. The likely causes of these variations are
manifold and impossible to assign from the data shown
Figure 2.
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here. However, the researchers were interested to see
if presenting these graphs to managers might raise
questions relating to health.
When these graphs were shown to managers at the
site in question, one line manager began to recall
complaints from the welders relating to poor levels of
lighting, amongst other things, which he considered
may be worthy of investigation in relation to the num-
ber of absences due to headaches. However, company
senior managers who were shown the results of the
analysis were skeptical of its meaning in health terms.
The company is currently involved in an absence re-
duction programme, which has proved effective in
reducing lost time. This programme includes a coun-
selling system which requires all persons having time
off due to sickness to be interviewed by their manager
on their return. The senior managers shown the sick-
ness absence results tended to concentrate upon the
time loss element rather than any health information
which the data might contain. This may be conditioned
by the current absence reduction drive.
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Interviews. When asked questions regarding their
opinions of what constituted a typical accident in their
organization, all respondents felt that the typical acci-
dent was one which resulted in minor injury. When
asked their opinions of what causes accidents, 75% of
first responses cited carelessness and complacency in
the injured party as being the major cause. However,
25% of first responses did acknowledge the impact of
work systems within the organization and the inherent
risks of the work being carried out as fundamental
causes. This proportional split in views corresponds
reasonably well with the findings of the accident report
analysis discussed earlier.
The interviewees were also asked their opinions
regarding 'accident proneness' i.e. the relative likeli-
hood of individuals to have accidents. Seventy-five per
cent of respondents believed that some people are
more prone to have accidents than others. Of these
respondents, 67% of first responses relating to cause
of the phenomenon cited personal characteristics such
as IQ, level of educational attainment and innate per-
sonality, although 28% of total responses did cite the
varying exposures to risk and/or the carrying out of
boring or repetitive tasks as the greatest influences on
accident tendency. Work carried out by researchers in
the field of accident proneness13 has, in fact, failed to
identify personal factors which are stable and common
to 'accident prone' people, although the tendency for
some people to have more accidents than others has
been established.
When asked about how they viewed their own role
in injury prevention, the responses during the discus-
sions broke down into seven categories, all respondents
citing a mix of the following:
• Identifying hazards, which included such activities
as hazard spotting, carrying out inspections and
audits and recording accidents and near misses.
• Controlling plant safety, which included ensuring
PPE was available, guards provided for equipment
where necessary, correct design of processes,
layout of plant and systems working correctly.
• Communication with the workforce, which
included responding to requests, acting as a
sounding board, communicating with individuals,
organizing local safety committees and carrying
out safety audits with safety representatives.
• Training/education, which included giving
presentations, cascade training, promoting good
practice and giving advice.
• Controlling people, which included supervision,
monitoring, control and counselling of employees,
and monitoring and reducing lost time accidents.
• Demonstrating commitment which included
being a figurehead, demonstrating involvement,
promoting safety, promoting awareness and
implementing the company's policy.
• Controlling the working environment, including
eliminating problems at source.
This list reflects the issues generally held to be
central to managing the practical elements of
managing OSH issues. One notable feature of the
responses to the interview questions was the clear
commitment to safety issues displayed by the
managers. They were not asked the question directly,
but many respondents took the opportunity to say
they were committed to reducing accidental injury
during the discussions. Of course, interviewer inter-
ference levels are likely to be high when questions
relate to an emotive topic such as personal injury.
It is highly unlikely that anyone would admit to a
low level of commitment under these circumstances.
However, the documentary analysis phase may
support the tenet of commitment, partly through
the high response rate on the injury report forms
(90%). Even though most of the injuries were minor
and related to everyday activities, generally the
reports were diligently completed by the relevant
managers.
Discussions around the subject of occupational
health, as opposed to injury, elicited the widest
variation in comments. Many respondents did not have
any real views on the links between occupation and ill
health and had made no connection between the two
in their minds. Of those who did identify links, 33%
of first responses related to back strains and 22% of
first responses related to stress. Other conditions cited
were dermatitis, general muscle strains and possible
respiratory effects. Twenty per cent of respondents felt
that >5% of their site's sickness absence was due to
occupational ill health. The remaining 80% saw <5%
or none of the sickness absence being related to
working conditions. Those respondents who cited
stress and related anxiety conditions as being particu-
larly important work-related health effects, seemed to
form their views from experience of significant levels
of stress throughout the organization at all levels of
responsibility. Some respondents did feel that middle
and senior managers were more liable to be affected
by stress, but all respondents who discussed stress felt
that it was a 'taboo' subject and that the organization
would show little sympathy to a stress sufferer.
None of the respondents could truly define their role
in the prevention of occupational ill health. There was
a significant discrepancy between the answers to
defining their role in injury prevention, which were
quite detailed as shown above, and the lack of any
firm ideas about their role in ill health prevention.
There was clearly a feeling that occupational illness
was not something over which they had much control
and neither was it generally felt to be suffered much
in this organization. In many cases the discussions
relating to occupational ill health quickly moved away
from how to prevent the illnesses to how to prevent
sickness absence and claims against the company.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The organization under study is a classic bureaucracy14
with well-defined systems, generally clear role defini-
tion and an apparent commitment to reducing
accidental injury. Collection of injury data is efficient,
but illness data is less well compiled. Line and senior
managers have a generally clear comprehension of
their role in injury prevention, but are much less clear
regarding the relevance of their role in prevention of
ill-health. They have a tendency to cite operator error
as being the major contributory factor to accident
causation, but this appears to be due in part to the
way in which they receive information regarding injuries.
The tendency to see accident causation as largely
being a feature of operator error is potentially danger-
ous, if it blinds an organization to the importance of
latent failures. The authors have therefore suggested
the trial of a safety and health review system which
addresses organizational issues, as well as some more
traditional hardware items. The reasons for choosing
to trial a review are twofold: (1) the results will hope-
fully provide useful information to the organization
regarding the efficiency of some of its OSH control
systems and shift the emphasis away from the counting
of lost time accidents; and (2) the researcher's interest
is to observe any changes to the perception of OSH
issues in the managers who are involved in carrying
but the review. The system will require them to ask
questions which do not appear to be widely or formally
asked at present.
The model for the topics covered by the review is
the list of General Failure Types modified by Reason,
Groeneweg, et al.9 This trial is currently underway.
The major recommendation for future research
which has resulted from this study is in the area of
the impact and influence of OSH data upon manage-
ment decisions. Research in other management fields
shows that perspectives can be greatly influenced by
the way in which data are presented.15 However, little
research has been carried out in the field of data
relating to occupational injury and ill health.
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